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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-COURT ORDERS 
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION RATHER THAN DISBARMENT 
AS SANCTION FOR LAWYER WHO MISAPPROPRIATED 
CLIENT FUNDS IN ESCROW ACCOUNT. Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Bakos, 323 Md. 395, 593 A.2d 1087 
(1991). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the only professionals with the expertise to make society's 
legal system available to citizens at large, lawyers have unique re-
sponsibilities with regard to maintaining and promoting justice. Cli-
ents place faith and trust in lawyers to handle their affairs competently, 
diligently, and honestly. I 
When a lawyer mishandles client funds, the lawyer is violating 
the trust and loyalty that defines the lawyer-client relationship. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that Maryland courts addressing this prob- . 
lem comment on the need not merely to punish the lawyer who 
mishandles client funds but also to protect society from a lawyer 
who demonstrates an unworthiness to practice law. 2 
Recently, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland seems to 
have de-emphasized the purpose of protecting the public through 
disciplinary actions. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bakos, 3 
the court of appeals held that the commingling of personal and client 
escrow funds by an attorney warranted indefinite suspension rather 
than disbarment. The court found that there were external circum-
stances so compelling as to require the usual sentence of disbarment 
to be mitigated to indefinite suspension.4 The court did not cite prior 
case law, however, nor offer an explanation in reaching its conclu-
sion. 
Gus Bakas was retained by Douglas Sandhofer as counsel after 
being injured in an automobile accident on September 30, 1983. S On 
1. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY. Preamble (2nd 
ed. 1992). 
2. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mandel. 294 Md. 560. 586-88. 451 A.2d 
910. 923 (1982) (citing Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew. 271 Md. 543, 318 
A.2d 811 (1974»; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 
381-83, 420 A.2d 940. 959-60 (1980). cert. denied. 450 U.S. 970 (1981); 
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman. 273 Md. 306. 318. 329 A.2d I, 7 
(1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S. 974 (1975). 
3. 323 Md. 395. 593 A.2d 1087 (1991). 
4. [d. at 403-04, 593 A.2d at 1091-92. 
5. [d. at 397. 593 A.2d at 1088. 
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June C, 1984, Bakas settled Sandhofer's claim against the other driver 
for $7,750.00, and collected Personal Injury Protection benefits to-
talling $3,315.75 from two insurers on Sandhofer's behalf.6 On that 
same day, the total recovery of $11 ,065.75 was deposited into Bakas' 
escrow account. 7 
The trial court judge found that between June 23 and November 
6 of 1984, Bakas withdrew money from the escrow account for 
personal and professional purposes, and never provided an accounting 
of the funds which he received on Sandhofer's behalf.8 During this 
time, the balance of the account fell below the amount owed to 
Sandhofer.9 In addition, Bakas neglected to pay Sandhofer's medical 
bills, for which Sandhofer was subsequently sued by his medical 
provider. 10 
Although at trial Bakas attempted to paint a picture of a life 
tainted by alcoholism, the trial court concluded that there was no 
causal connection between his misconduct and his problems with 
alcohol. lI The court found that Bakas "unlawfully commingled his 
personal funds with client funds"12 and was guilty of violating a 
variety of Disciplinary Rules. 13 
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 397, 593 A.2d at 1088-89. 
8. [d. at 398, 593 A.2d at 1089. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. 
II. [d. at 398-99, 593 A.2d at 1089. 
12. [d. at 398, 593 A.2d at 1089. 
13. [d. at 397 n.l, 593 A.2d at 1088 n.t. The disciplinary rules at issue were DR 
1-102, DR 6-10I(A)(3), and DR 9-102. DR 1-102, prohibiting "misconduct," 
provides in relevant part as follows: ' 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. 
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. 
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, Ot mis-
representation. 
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his 
fitness to practice law. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY DR 1-102(A) (1984). In relevant 
part, DR 6-101 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... [n]eglect a legal matter 
entrusted to him." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 6-
IOI(A)(3) (1984). DR 9-102(B) addresses the preservation and identification of 
client funds and property: 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other 
properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and 
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II. THE INSTANT CASE 
In upholding the trial court's decision, the court of appeals 
addressed whether Bakas' alcoholism was the cause of his misconduct, 
and whether disbarment was the appropriate sanction. 14 The court 
explained that the trial judge's findings of fact are prima facie correct 
and should remain undisturbed unless clearly erroneous. IS The trial 
court considered a number of things in reaching its conclusion: (1) 
the credibility of an expert witness on alcoholism, (2) a report of a 
psychiatric evaluation, and (3) the testimony of the defendant, Bakas. 16 
The trial judge found that, although Bakas abused alcohol for nearly 
forty years, there was little or no direct e¥idence to support his claim 
that alcoholism was the direct cause of his professional mfsconduct. 17 
The factual findings demonstrated that Bakas "functioned as a 
maintenance alcoholic without incident for a number of years in the 
ptactice of law."18 The court of appeals found that the trial judge 
was not clearly erroneous in determining that the substantial cause 
of Bakas' misconduct was not his alcoholism.l9 
The court subsequently addressed the issue of sanctions, and 
recognized that "[m]isappropriation of funds by an attorney is an 
act infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in 
disbarment in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances 
justifying a lesser sanction. "20 Although the court discounted Bakas' 
alcoholism as a causal factor in his misconduct, the court found 
other factors which it deemed so compelling as to warrant an' 
indefinite suspension rather than disbarment. 21 In its rationale, the 
court merely stated that "all the circumstances, including the nature 
render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them. 
(4) Promptly payor deliver to the client as requested by a client 
the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the 
lawyer which the client is entitled to receive. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(B)(3) & (4) (1984). 
14. See Bakos, 323 Md. at 403, 593 A.2d at 1091. The court found that Bakas 
functioned as a maintenance alcoholic for many years and that during this 
time there were no offending incidents relating to the practice of law. Id. The 
court also found that he possessed the necessary state of mind to secret 
$10,000.00 in his escrow account arid elude attachment from the IRS, and that 
he successfully handled the Sandhofer case. Id. Thus, the court concluded that 
if his alcohol did not affect his ability to perform the aforementioned functions· 
then it could not cause his misconduct in the instant case. Id. 
15. Id. at 402, 593 A.2d at 1091. 
16. Id. at 401~02, 593 A.2d at 1090-91. 
17. Id. at 403, 593 A.2d at 1091. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 403, 593 A.2d at 1091-92 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ezrin, 
312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988». 
21. Id. at 403-04, 593 A.2d at 1091-92. 
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and gravity of the misappropriation, and the relatively short period 
during which Bakas' escrow account was in arrears,"22 warranted an 
indefinite suspension. 23 
III. BACKGROUND 
In Bar Ass'n v. Marshall,24 the court of appeals held that "when 
a practitioner, through his actions, demonstrates a failure to maintain 
the high moral standards of the profession, by dishonestly appropri-
ating his client's funds to his own use, we should not hesitate to 
withdraw the privilege of membership in the legal fraternity of this 
State. "25 In Marshall, the defendant was disbarred after being found 
guilty of holding $2,344 in client-owned funds in his personal ac-
count.26 The court also found that the defendant unlawfully refused 
to deliver the money to the client upon demand.27 In the absence of 
compelling extenuating circumstances, the court concluded that dis-
barment should follow as a matter of course.28 The court further 
commented that the gravity of the defendant's conduct was aggra-
vated by the fact that his testimony was found to be unbelievable. 29 
The Marshall court stated that, although courts should cautiously 
exercise their power to disbar, there should be no hesitation when 
the purpose of disbarment is to protect the public.30 The purpose of 
disbarment is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public 
from someone who has manifested his or her unworthiness to con-
tinue practicing law. 31 Failure to disbar a deviant attorney "impliedly 
represent[s] to the public that the attorney continues to possess the 
basic qualities of honor traditionally associated with members of the 
bar of this State. "32 
As far back as 1917, Judge Cardozo, in In re ROUSS,33 inquired 
into whether disbarment is a penalty or a forfeiture. 34 Cardozo 
maintained that disbarment is not punishment because its purpose is 
to maintain a "suspicion-free" bar, not to penalize the attorney.35 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 404, 593 A.2d at 1092. 
24. 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973). 
25. [d. at 518, 307 A.2d at 681. 
26. [d. at SIS, 520, 307 A.2d at 680, 682. 
27. [d. at 514, 307 A.2d at 679. 
28. [d. at 520, 307 A.2d at 682. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. at 518, 307 A.2d at 681. 
31. [d. at 519, 307 A.2d at 682. 
32. [d. at 520, 307 A.2d at 682. 
33. 116 N.E. 782 (N.Y. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918). 
34. [d. at 783. 
35. [d. 
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Punishment is left to the criminal justice system.36 The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has historically adhered to this policy. 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mandel,37 the court of 
appeals quoted the following: 
A court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to 
insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and 
to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from 
bringing its image into disrepute. Disciplinary procedures 
have been established for this purpose, not for punishment, 
but rather as a catharsis for the profession and a prophy-
lactic for the public. 38 
The Mandel court held that when an attorney is charged with 
misconduct that involves dishonesty, moral turpitude, fraud, or de-
ceit, and that conduct is committed with the intent to enhance the 
attorney's own well-being at the expense of a client, disbarment 
should follow as a matter of course.39 Further, the disbarment 
sanction is mitigated only by the presence of compelling extenuating 
circumstances that existed at the time of the crime's commission.40 
The Mandel court referred to the court of appeals' prior delineation 
of "compelling extenuating circumstances": 
Those considerations which potentially could merit this des-
ignation, even though the respondent has been convicted of 
a crime involving moral turpitude, are only those which 
may cause this Court to view the conviction in a light which 
tends to show that the respondent's illegal act, committed 
in violation of a criminal statute, resulted from intensely 
strained· circumstance or that the magnitude and the nature 
of the crime are not so severe as to compel disbarment. 41 
36. [d. at 784-85. 
37. 294 Md. 560, 451 A.2d 910 (1982). 
38. [d. at 586, 451 A.2d at 923 (quoting Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 
Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974) (citing Balliet v. Baltimore County 
Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 270 A.2d 465 (1970))). 
39. [d. at 588, 451 A.2d at 923. 
40. [d.; see also Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Molovinsky, 300 Md. 291, 297, 
477 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1984) (holding that genuine contrition and rehabilitative 
efforts did not constitute compelling extenuating circumstances); Fellner v. Bar 
Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957) (disbarring an attorney for deceitful 
conduct without considering, as an extenuating circumstance, the attorney's 
minimal financial gain from the conduct); cf. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v . 
. Flynn , 283 Md. 41, 45-47, 387 A.2d 775, 777-78 (1978) (holding that alcoholism, 
existing at the time of the offense, was a compelling extenuating circumstance). 
41. Mandel, 294 Md. at 586, 451 A.2d at 922 (quoting Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 275 
Md. 521, 527, 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975». 
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The Mandel court's characterization of these compelling extenuating 
circumstances was in keeping with prior Maryland case law. 
For example, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Flynn,42 the 
court held that an indefinite suspension was appropriate. 43 The court 
held that the defendant's alcoholism was so compelling as to warrant 
a sanction less than disbarment.44 In that case, however, the attorney's 
misconduct developed proportionally to the severity of his alcohol-
ism.45 
In cases where misappropriation of funds is at issue, the court 
of appeals has usually disbarred the offending attorney. There are, 
however, a few cases where the court has imposed a sanction other 
than disbarment. For example, in Attorney Grievance Commission 
v. Singleton,46 the court ordered an indefinite suspension. Singleton 
involved the careless management of an escrow account.47 Since the 
attorney's honesty was not at issue in Singleton, the sanction imposed 
did not contravene the policy supporting disbarment for misconduct 
involving deceit and moral turpitude.48 
The court of appeals also imposed a sanction other than dis-
barment in Prince George's County Bar Ass'n v. Vance. 49 Unlike 
. Bakas, Vance involved forgery.5o The defendant committed forgery 
in order to gain access to a military post exchange.51 In suspending 
the attorney, the court considered the nature and gravity of the 
misconduct along with the attorney's "genuine contrition" and es-
teem in the community. 52 
The Vance decision seems to be an anomaly, in that "genuine 
contrition" and esteem in the community are factors not usually 
considered in cases involving deceitful and dishonest misconduct. In 
fact, years later, the court, in Attorney Grievance Commission. v. 
Ezrin,s3 expressly refused to consider the defendant's good character, 
favorable reputation as a lawyer, lack of previous misconduct, res-
titution of the stolen property, and cooperation with the authorities 
in imposing a sanction.54 Although the amount of money at issue 
42. 283 Md. 41, 387 A.2d 775 (1978). 
43. Id. at 45-47, 387 A.2d at 778. 
44.Id. 
45. Id. at 46, 387 A.2d at 778. 
46. 311 Md. 1, 532 A.2d 157 (1987). 
47. Id. at 16, 532 A.2d at 165. 
48. Cj. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395,406, 593 A.2d 1087, 
1093 (1991) (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the majority's 
rationale is not supported by prior case law, including Singleton). 
49. 273 Md. 79, 327 A.2d 767 (1974). 
50. Id. at 81, 327 A.2d at 768. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 84, 327 A.2d at 770. 
53. 312 Md. 603, 541 A.2d 966 (1988). 
54. Id. at 609, 541 A.2d at 969. 
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was considerable in the Ezrin case, it is unlikely that the court 
sanctioned disbarment based on that fact alone. Prior case law 
dictates that the amount of money is inconsequential when the act 
in question involves deceit or dishonesty. For example, in Fellner v. 
Bar Association,SS an attorney was disbarred for inserting slugs into 
a parking meter. S6 The court reasoned that, although the financial 
gain was small, the misconduct was deliberate and deceitful, thereby 
warranting disbarment. S7 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly stated that 
misappropriation of funds by an attorney, be the amount small or 
large, coupled with deceit and fraud, is the gravest form of attorney 
misconduct. S8 Consequently, a lesser sanction than disbarment is 
warranted only when there are compelling extenuating circum-
stances.S9 Since Bakas' misconduct was couched in deceit and fraud, 
the court's sanction, an indefinite suspension, was a deviation from 
the norm.60 Although the Bakas majority states that compelling 
extenuating circumstances are present, it fails to disclose the nature 
of these circumstances.61 The court merely indicates that it considered 
"all the circumstances, including the nature and gravity of the 
misappropriation, and the relatively short period during which Bakas' 
escrow account was in arrears.' '62 The court should have provided 
stronger support for its sentencing decision, especially in light of the 
decision's blatant contradiction with prior case law63 and the effect 
it will have as precedent on future cases. 
55. 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957). 
56. Id. at 247, 131 A.2d at 731. 
57. Id. at 247, 131 A.2d at 731-32. 
58. See, e.g., Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973) 
(citing Balliet v. Baltimore County Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 479, 270 A.2d 
465, 468 (1970); In re Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 218 A.2d 208 (1966); In re 
Williams, 180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7 (1941». 
59. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 404, 593 A.2d at 1087, 
1092 (1991) (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting). 
60. Id. (citing In re Murray, 316 Md. 303, 308, 558 A.2d 710, 712 (1989); Attorney 
Grievance Comm'n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 426-27, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 
(1988), petition jor reinstatement denied, 319 Md. 700, 575 A.2d 330 (1990); 
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 
969 (1988); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 687, 480 
A.2d 807, 817 (1984); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mo\ovinsky, 300 Md. 
291,296,477 A.2d 1181, 1184 (1984); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Pattison, 
292 Md. 599, 609, 441 A.2d 328, 333 (1982); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. 
Burka, 292 Md. 221,225, 438 A.2d 514, 517 (1981». 
61. Id. at 405-06, 593 A.2d at 1093. 
62. Id. at 403-04, 593 A.2d at 1091-92. 
63. See id. at 404, 593 A.2d at 1092 and cases cited therein. 
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As indicated in the Marshall and Mandel decisions, disbarment 
is appropriate whenever the offense involves deceit or dishonesty. 
The. rationale for such a stringent sentence lies in the court's desire 
to protect the public from an impure legal system.64 In light of this 
policy consideration, the amount of misappropriated funds or the 
length of time the escrow account was in arrears is irrelevant. 65 The 
importance lies in the fact that the attorney violated the very system 
he is supposed to uphold. 
The court of appeals has historically held that intensely strained 
circumstances present at the time of the commission of the crime 
constitute compelling extenuating circumstances.66 As noted previ-
ously, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Flynn,67 the court of 
appeals ordered an indefinite suspension after holding that the at-
torney was guilty of, inter alia, neglecting legal matters and com-
mingling clients' funds with his own.68 The court found that Flynn's 
misconduct developed proportionately to the development of his 
alcoholism and other problems. Therefore, his misconduct resulted, 
to a substantial extent, from these maladies, including alcoholism.69 
Bakas, on the other hand, functioned competently for many years 
while suffering with alcoholism.70 The causal connection present in 
Flynn was, therefore, missing in Bakas. 
The Flynn court emphasized that it was not "softening [its] 
revulsion. for misuse by an attorney of his clients' funds,"7l because 
the indefinite suspension would not be terminated unless the attorney 
could demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence amounting to 
a moral certainty, that he was able to overcome the malady from 
which he suffered and complete rehabilitation so that the misconduct 
would not be repeated.72 
The court of appeals, in Bar Ass'n v. Marshall,?3 emphasized 
that the concept of truSt is the crux of the attorney-client relationship, 
64. Balliet v. Baltimore County Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 478, 270 A.2d 465, 468 
(1970). 
65. Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973) (citing 
Balliet v. Baltimore County Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 270 A.2d 465 (1970); In 
re Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 218 A.2d 208 (1966); In re Williams, 180 Md. 689, 
. 23 A.2d 7 (1941». 
66. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 586, 451 A.2d 910, 922 
(1982) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Flynn, 283 Md. 41, 387 A.2d 
775 (1978); Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 527, 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975». 
67. 283 Md. 41, 387 A.2d 775 (1978). 
68. Id. at 45-46, 387 A.2d at 778. 
69.Id. 
70. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 
(1991). 
71. Flynn, 283 Md.'at 46-47, 387 A.2d at 778. 
72.Id. 
73. 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973). 
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with the attorney acting as "trustee" for the client in all of his 
endeavors.74 The court specifically noted the importance of trust with 
respect to the handling of client funds. 75 According to the court, 
attorneys must constantly keep the notion of this trust in mind,as 
well as the fact that they "are strictly accountable for their conduct 
in administering that trust, so they dare not appropriate those funds 
and properties for their personal use. "76 The court concluded that 
"misappropriation of funds ... be the amount small or large, is of 
great concern and represents the gravest form of professional mis-
conduct."77 Since it is trust, and not the amount of money, that is 
at the heart of the attorney-client relationship, the amount of money 
at issue is inconsequential. If an attorney breaches this trust, he has 
failed in his duties. It follows, therefore, that only the most com-
pelling circumstances can warrant a lesser sanction than disbarment. 
Prior case law establishes that compelling extenuating circum-
stances need not be present in the absence of deceit or dishonesty in 
order to warrant a lesser sanction than disbarment, as evidenced by 
the court of appeals' holding in Singleton. In contrast to the facts 
of Bakas, the attorney's honesty was not at issue in Singleton. 78 The 
Singleton court found no evidence of fraud or deceit, and the only 
issue was the lawyer's "ineptitude in managing the escrow account."79 
It does seem unfair, however, to sanction Bakas in the same 
manner as attorneys who have misappropriated a greater amount of 
funds for a longer time period. Counterbalancing this moral unfair-
ness, however, is the abundance of case law and strong public policy 
which supports disbarment when the misconduct involves deceit or 
dishonesty. Perhaps the legal justification underlying disbarment will 
change over time if more cases are decided similar to Bakas. At this 
juncture, however, it appears as though Bakas is an aberration. As 
professed in Marshall, 
a lawyer's duty is a high one which, because of the nature 
of the relationship that exists between an attorney and his 
client, embraces moral standards that are more stringent 
than those applicable to others .... The very administration 
of justice under our adversary system is dependent upon 




78. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395,406,593 A.2d 1087, 1093 
(1991) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Singleton, 311 Md. 1, 16, 532 
A.2d 157, 163 (1987». 
79. Id. (citing Singleton, 311 Md. at 16, 532 A.2d at 165). 
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the ability of members of the public as well as the courts 
to rely on the integrity of counsel . . . .80 
Under the facts of Bakas, a sanction less than disbarment contradicts 
the policy of protecting society from people unworthy to practice 
law. 
In addition, by distinguishing between serious misappropriations 
and those that do not involve a substantial amount of money, the 
court in Bakas deviated from its strict rule of disbarment for mis-
appropriation. What may be a minimal amount of money to the 
court may be a significant loss to the client. The court should not 
place a value judgment on how much a client's property is worth to 
him or her, especially in light of the aforementioned policy of 
protecting the courts and the public in their reliance on the integrity 
of legal counsel. 
By merely suspending attorneys who misappropriate small 
amounts, the court is taking on the role of the criminal justice 
system, punishing the attorney in proportion to the severity of the 
crime. The court does not treat misappropriation uniformly when 
the intent behind all misappropriations is the same, i.e., to steal. 
The impression this leaves is that stealing a little is not as serious as 
stealing a lot. This rationale is sufficient for the criminal justice 
system in which an element of sentencing is punishment;81 as repeated 
in so many cases, however, the purpose behind disciplinary actions 
is to protect society, not to punish the attorney.82 The holding of 
the Bakas court fails to take responsibility for the integrity of the 
profession. Instead it implies to the public that the court will tolerate 
this type of conduct as long as the amount of the money stolen is 
not, in its estimation, substantial. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the lagging economy, there is more motivation for miscon-
duct involving finances and the misappropriation of funds. A holding 
such as the one in Bakas does not make sense if protecting the public 
from unscrupulous lawyers is to remain an objective of disciplinary 
actions. Decisions like Bakas could affect how the public views the 
profession. As stated by the Marshall court: 
80. Marshall, 269 Md. at 518-19, 307 A.2d at 682. 
81. [d. at 519, 307 A.2d at 682. 
82. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 586, 451 A.2d 910, 
923 (1982) (citing Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 
811 (1974»; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Engerman, 289 Md. 330, 346, 424 
A.2d 362, 370 (1981); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 
329 A.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975). . 
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To this, we add that of no small concern to the general 
membership of the bar should be the fact that the standing 
in the community of the legal profession is frequently meas-
ured by the deviations of the dishonest few rather than by 
the standard of great devotion and honor which is set by 
the vast majority of members of the fraternity.s3 
It is the court's obligation, therefore, to withdraw unworthy attorneys 
from the practice of law. To fail to do so could both perpetuate and 
reinforce the legal system's damaged reputation and represent to the 
public that offending attorneys possess the basic qualities traditionally 
associated with the more honorable members of the bar of this 
state.84 
Wendy A. Lassen 
83. Marshall, 269 Md. at 519, 307 A.2d at 682. 
84. [d. at 520, 307 A.2d at 682. 
